NAVAL vs. ENRIQUEZ - G.R. No. 1318

PRISCA NAVAL, ET AL. vs. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. 1318 

April 12, 1904

Don Jorge Enriquez, as heir of his deceased parents, Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, whose estates were at that time still undistributed, by public instrument sold to Don Victoriano Reyes his interest in both estates, equivalent to a tenth part thereof. By another instrument executed, Don Enrique Barrera, Don Victoriano Reyes sold to Doña Carmen de la Cavada his interest in the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, which he had acquired from Don Jorge Enriquez. The purchaser, Doña Carmen, was the wife of Don Francisco Enriquez, who was the executor and administrator of the testamentary estate of Don Antonio Enriquez at the dates of the execution of the two mentioned. The plaintiffs demand that these deeds be declared null and void, as well as the contracts evidenced thereby, apparently solely so far as they refer to the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez, no mention being made of the estate of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva in the complaint. This relief is prayed for upon the grounds that the deeds in question were consummated and were executed for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding Don Jorge Enriquez and his family, and such executor Don Francisco Enriquez was unable to acquire by his own act or that of any intermediary the said hereditary portion of Don Jorge Enriquez under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1459 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the deeds executed are null and void.

HELD:

            No. The date of those contracts down to the death of Jorge Enriquez, which occurred July 6, 1891, more than five year had passed and more than fifteen before the filing of the complaint on January 9, 1902, nothing having been done in the meantime on the part of the plaintiffs or the person under whom they claim to interrupt the running of the statute. The action of nullity only lasts four years, counted from the date of the consummation of the contract, when the action is based, as in this case, upon the absence of consideration. (Art. 1301 of the Civil Code.) The contract of sale is consummated by the delivery of the purchase money and of the thing sold.(Art. 1462, par. 2, Civil Code.)

Article 1464 provides that "With respect to incorporeal property, the provisions of par. 2 of Art. 1462 shall govern." In the deeds of sale executed by Victoriano Reyes in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada, in consequence he (the vendor) by virtue of this title cedes and conveys all rights which he has or may have to the part of the inheritance which is the object of this sale may exercise all the acts of ownership corresponding to her right, to which end by means of the delivery of this instrument and of his other title deeds he makes the transfer necessary to consummate the contract, which upon his part he declares to be perfect and consummated from this date.

ROMAN vs. GRIMALT - G.R. No. L-2412

PEDRO ROMAN vs. ANDRES GRIMALT

G.R. No. L-2412           

April 11, 1906

Grimalt and Roman, through one Fernando Agustin Pastor, verbally agreed upon the sale of a schooner. Roman accepted the plan of payment suggested and that from that date the vessel was at his disposal, and offered to deliver the same at once to defendant if he so desired. The contract having been closed and the vessel being ready for delivery to the purchaser, it was sunk about in the harbor of Manila and is a total loss, as a result of a severe storm. Demand was made upon the defendant for the payment of the purchase price of the vessel in the manner stipulated and defendant failed to pay. Plaintiff finally prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with the prayer of his previous complaint. Defendant alleged that plaintiff personally proposed to the defendant the sale of the said vessel, the plaintiff stating that the vessel belonged to him and that it was then in a sea worthy condition. Defendant accepted the offer of sale on condition that the title papers were found to be satisfactory, also that the vessel was in a seaworthy condition. The plaintiff promised to perfect his title and called on defendant to close the sale. The defendant believing that plaintiff had perfected his title, wrote to him and set for the execution of the contract, but, upon being informed that plaintiff had done nothing to perfect his title, he insisted that he would buy the vessel only when the title papers were perfected and the vessel duly inspected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale has been perfected that the buyer should bear the loss.’

HELD:

            No. The sale of the schooner was not perfected and the purchaser did not consent to the execution of the deed of transfer for the reason that the title of the vessel was in the name of one Paulina Giron and not in the name of Pedro Roman, the alleged owner. Roman promised, however, to perfect his title to the vessel, but he failed to do so. The papers presented by him did not show that he was the owner of the vessel. If no contract of sale was actually executed by the parties the loss of the vessel must be borne by its owner and not by a party who only intended to purchase it and who was unable to do so on account of failure on the part of the owner to show proper title to the vessel and thus enable them to draw up the contract of sale.

A sale shall be considered perfected and binding as between vendor and vendee when they have agreed as to the thing which is the object of the contract and as to the price, even though neither has been actually delivered. (Art. 1450 of the Civil Code.) When the sale is made by means of a public instrument the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. (Art. 1462 of the Civil Code.)

OCEJO, PEREZ & CO. vs. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION - G.R. No. L-10658

OCEJO, PEREZ & CO. vs.

THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-10658            February 14, 1918

Chua Teng Chong gave a promissory note to International Banking Corporation. 5000piculs of sugar, located in a warehouse in Calle Toneleros, was put up as security for the note. It seems that Ocejo, Perez and Co. entered into contract with Chua Teng Chong for the sale of some sugar. The sugar was brought to Manila and 5,000 piculs were delivered by to Chua Teng Chong whereupon it was stored in a warehouse at No. 119, Muelle de la Industria. The next day, petitioners attempted to collect the purchase price of the sugar, but the buyer refused to make payment. In the written contract between them, nothing was said concerning the time and place for payment. When the promissory note executed had fallen due and was unpaid, the bank made the effort to exercise active ownership over the sugar it discovered that the amount of sugar in his warehouse was less than the 5,000 piculs. Chua Teng Chong said that the rest of the sugar was in a warehouse at No. 119, Muelle de la Industria. The bank’s representatives then went to this warehouse and found some 3,200 piculs which they immediately seized, closing the warehouse with the bank's padlocks. Ocejo demand the bank to return the sugar, which the latter refused. Petitioners filed a complaint, with the bank as defendant, alleging that the bank was unlawfully holding the property of the plaintiff firm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chua Teng Chong failure to pay the purchase price authorize the seller to rescind the sale.

HELD:

Yes. There can be no doubt that the parties agreed in regard to the quantity of the sugar which the seller was to deliver and the price which the buyer was to pay, the contract was perfected. (Civil Code, Art. 1450.) It is also clear that the obligation of the seller to make delivery of the thing sold was not subject to the condition that the buyer was to pay the price before delivery. The sugar was delivered to the buyer. The seller delivered it into the buyer's warehouse, leaving it entirely subject to his control. Article 1462 of the Civil Code provides that the thing sold is deemed to be delivered "when it passes into the possession and control of the buyer." It is difficult to see how the seller could have divested himself more completely of the possession of the sugar, or how he could have placed it more completely under the control of the buyer. On the day following the delivery of the sugar the seller presented his bill to the buyer, but the latter failed and refused to make payment. The seller was entitled to demand payment of the sugar at any time after the delivery. No term having been stipulated within which the payment should be made, payment was demandable at the time and place of the delivery of the thing sold. (Civil Code, Art. 1500.)

EASTON vs. E. DIAZ & COMPANY - G.R. No. 10012

WALTER EASTON vs. E. DIAZ & COMPANY

and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ALBAY

G.R. No. 10012                        November 9, 1915

The counsel for Walter Easton filed a written complaint in the CFI alleging that he was the sole and exclusive owner of a still bearing the trade-mark "Ecrot" installed on a piece of land occupied by Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., and in charge of Jose Parlade. As a result of the civil case of said court brought by E. Diaz and company against Jose Parlade, in spite of defendant knowing that this still did not belong to Parlade, sought in bad faith to have it attached. The plaintiff presented to the sheriff a third party claim of ownership, setting forth therein that damages to the extent of not less that P100 a day were being caused the claimant for each day the sheriff retained the still in his possession because this was the season for the distillation of ilang-ilang. But the defendant company gave bond to secure the sheriff in order that he might proceed to sell the still at public auction. The latter's counsel, therefore, prayed the court that a preliminary injunction issue against the defendant company, its attorneys, agents and employees, and the provincial sheriff, restraining them from performing any act whatever which might prevent the plaintiff from using the said distilling apparatus, to order the sheriff to make immediate return of the still to the place where it had been installed, upon the furnishing of such bond as the court might consider sufficient, to declare that the said still is the exclusive property of the plaintiff, and to sentence the defendant company to pay to the plaintiff the sum of at least P100 for each day that has elapsed or may elapse from the date of the attachment of the still to that of its return, with the costs against the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged conveyance of the still by Parlade to Easton actually took place.

HELD:

No. The fact that the still was never delivered to the purchaser is a circumstance which, in view of the evidence adduced by the defendant company, strengthens the conviction that no such sale took place and that the still continues to belong to Parlade. For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other property rights, the thing transferred must be delivered, inasmuch as, according to settled jurisprudence the tradition of the thing is a necessary and indispensable requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by virtue of a contract.

For the acquisition and transmission by law of ownership and other property rights, delivery of the things transferred is indispensable. (Art. 609, Civ. Code.) It is a doctrine established by jurisprudence, that the delivery of a thing is a necessary and indispensable requisite in order to acquire its ownership by virtue of a contract.

GONZALES vs. ROJAS - G.R. No. 5449

MARIANO GONZALES ET AL. vs. ALEJANDRO ROJAS

G.R. No. 5449

March 22, 1910

The subject land of fishery belonged to the sisters Juliana Samonte and Atanasia Samonte, during their lifetime, who are said to have inherited it from their grandfather, Jose Samonte. These sisters leased the property to Mamerto Siaoson under a contract for 12 years. The first sale was made by the Juliana Samonte to Alejandro Rojas, on February 2, 1900. Juliana Samonte died on March 10 of the same year. From March 21, 1895, to the same date of 1907, Mamerto Siaoson was entitled to the possession and lease of the fishery. For this reason, Juliana Samonte, on February 24, 1900, said that the lease still had six years to run. Juliana Samonte and Alejandro Rojas expressly stipulated, in the document of contract, Exhibit No. 1, that as soon as the said six years of the lease should have expired "and this land is returned to us — Juliana’s words-immediately and without delay we will deliver the same to this married couple. On November 14, 1907, the delivery of this land had not yet been made to Alejandro Rojas; hence, by means of a notarial proceeding, the latter demanded of two sons of Juliana Samonte, Brigido and Matias Villanueva, the said delivery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by Juliana Samonte to Alejandro Rojas in 1900 remained in a state of dependency on the completion of the contract and was not consummated.

HELD:

            Yes. Article 1462 of the Civil Code provides that, a thing sold shall be considered as delivered when it is placed in the hands of the vendee. When the sale is made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if in said instrument the contrary does not appear or may be clearly inferred. No actual delivery was made of the possession of the reality in question. There was no public instrument, the execution of which could have constituted a form of delivery of the thing sold. On the contrary, from the instrument executed, which is only a private one, it clearly appears that the delivery of the fishery was postponed to a fixed date.

            Juliana Samonte’s heirs, having no knowledge of this obligation and making the fishery materially a part of the inheritance left by their mother, conveyed the property that had been held by her and which had been transferred to her successors in interests, without any complaint from a third party. It must be concluded that the sales effected by the heirs of Juliana Samonte to the petitioners were true, valid, and efficacious.

KUENZLE & STREIFF vs. MACKE & CHANDLER - G.R. No. L-5295

KUENZLE & STREIFF vs. MACKE & CHANDLER, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-5295

December 16, 1909

            The plaintiff alleges that it was the owner of the Oregon Saloon consisting of bar, furniture, furnishings, and fixtures in which the Jose Desiderio, as sheriff, levied upon by virtue of an execution issued upon a judgment secured by the defendant Macke & Chandler, against Stanley & Krippendorf. Said plaintiff notified the sheriff that it was the owner of said goods and forbade the sale thereof under said execution. The sheriff sold said goods under said execution and the firm of Macke & Chandler was the purchaser of said goods. Bachrach, Elser, and Gale, were the sureties upon the bond given to the sheriff by Macke & Chandler before said goods were sold. The defendants in this case allege that the property described by the plaintiff and sold at the execution sale referred to was not the property of the plaintiff at the time of said levy and sale, but was the property of Stanley & Krippendorf, who were in possession of the same at the time of such levy. They further allege that Stanley & Krippendorf, being indebted in a considerable sum to the plaintiff in this case, attempted to sell to the said plaintiff by an instrument in writing the property in question which was never recorded and was a private document. The said property was not delivered to the plaintiff but that property remained from the time of sale forward in the exclusive possession and control of said Stanley & Krippendorf, and that they conducted the business.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an effect in the said instrument of sale in transferring the property in question from Stanley & Krippendorf to the plaintiff.

HELD:

No. The ownership of personal property can not be transferred to the prejudice of third persons except by delivery of the property itself; and that a sale without delivery gives the would-be purchaser no rights in said property except those of a creditor. The bill of sale in the case at bar could have no effect against a person dealing with the property upon the faith of appearances. It is evident that the bill of sale was in no sense a conditional sale of property. Possession of the property in suit was not taken at any time by the plaintiff. The defendant Macke & Chandlre, having purchased the property at an execution sale, property conducted, obtained a good title to the property in question as against the plaintiff in this case.

RUFINA YATCO vs. JESUALDO GANA - G.R. No. L-3876

RUFINA YATCO vs. JESUALDO GANA

G.R. No. L-3876

March 27, 1909

The plaintiff, as heir to her father, Isidro Yatco, among other properties, received the lands in controversy. In consequence of proceedings in execution brought in by the late Yatco against the spouses Eugenio Andal and Gregoria Faciolco, the said lands were attached and as no bidders appeared at the public auction, they were adjudicated in payment to the execution creditor by an order of the lower court. The corresponding instrument of sale was not executed nor was the execution creditor put in possession of the property until 1902, in compliance with an order issued upon request of the said creditor. The credit of the execution creditor, Yatco, is not recorded in the registry of property, nor were the attached properties charged in the payment of any debts, or entered in the register. The defendant debtor, Andal, had informed the officer who was sent to enforce the order of attachment, that the property now in question had already been sold by him to the defendant, Jesualdo Gana, prior to the date of the attachment. Gana, acquired the said lands from Eugenio Andal by means of a public instrument of purchase and sale. The said instrument was lost during the late insurrection, but appears on the index of the notarial acts executed in La Laguna, on file at the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court. Since 1894, the defendant has been in possession of the said properties and has held them as owner until the present day and defendant was not required by the sheriff to deliver the possession of the lands to the representative of the late Yatco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the purchasers had acquired the ownership and dominion over the purchased thing in accordance with article 1473 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

Yes. The main point is the legitimacy of the sale made by Eugenio Andal to Jesualdo Gana, and the fact that this contract was executed even before the lands that were sold had been judicially attached. The trial court has not committed any error by declaring that Eugenio Andal could validly sell them to Jesualdo Gana and the circumstance that they were subject to the credit of Isidro Yatco against the spouses Andal and Faciolco was not an obstacle to the validity of the sale because they were not subject to the security of the credit as by a real right formally attached to the said lands, but by the mere delivery of the title deeds that the debtors made to the creditors.

There was no bad faith on the part of the purchaser even though it be supposed such existed on the part of the vendor, because it has not been shown in any manner that the purchaser was aware of any impediment to the vendor's lawfully effecting the sale of a thing that belonged to him.